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Abstract: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides financial assistance to its member-
countries in economic turmoil, but requires at the same time that these countries reform their 
public policies. In several contexts, these reforms are at odds with population health. While 
researchers have empirically analyzed the consequences of these reforms on health, no analysis 
exist on identifying fair tradeoffs between consequences on population health and economic 
outcomes. Our article analyzes and identifies the principles governing these tradeoffs. First, this 
article reviews existing policy-evaluation studies, which show, on balance, that IMF policies 
frequently cause adverse effects on children’s health and material standards in the pursuit of 
macroeconmic improvement. Second, this article discusses four theories in distributive ethics 
(maximization, egalitarianianism, prioritarianiasm, and sufficientarianism) to identify which is 
the most compatible with IMF’s core mission of improved macroeconomics (Articles of 
Agreement) while at the same time balancing consequences on health. Using a distributive-
ethics analyses of IMF polices, we argue that sufficientarianism is the most compatible theory. 
Third, this article offer a qualitative rearticulation of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, and 
formalize sufficientarian principles in the language of causal inference. We also offer a 
framework on how to empirically measure, from observational data, the extent that IMF policies 
trade off fairly between population health and economic outcomes. We conclude with policy 
recommendations and suggestions for future research.  
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Introduction 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has at its mission to monitor global financial systems 
and provide macroeconomic support to its 189 member-countries. It conditions this support on 
its own policies, the harshest being structural adjustments and austerity. Given the often 
invasive nature of IMF policies, subsequent consequences on population health programs have 
spurred considerable debates (Babb, 2005; McKee et al., 2012; Stuckler and Basu, 2013; 
Summers and Pritchett, 1993). Researchers have conducted empirical evaluations of IMF 
policies to identify which affect population health (Clements et al., 2013; Daoud et al., 2017; 
Daoud and Reinsberg, 2018; Dreher, 2009; Kentikelenis et al., 2016; Shandra et al., 2012; 
Stubbs et al., 2016; Vreeland, 2007).  
However, these empirical studies lack a key component found in distributive ethic studies; that 
is, transparency in what is considered fair and desirable outcomes. Ethics-based studies use 
normative arguments that focus on ought issues—they question and evaluate desirable 
outcomes—while empirical studies favor explanatory or descriptive arguments that focus on is 
issues—they evaluate causes and effects. Leaving out ought issues, empirical studies of IMF 
policies do not say much about how the IMF should trade off between population-health 
outcomes and macroeconomic outcomes.  
A distributive-ethics analysis of the Articles of Agreement that govern the IMF’s mission 
entails identifying which principles would reflect a fair tradeoff between health and economic 
outcomes (Daniels, 1985). This trade-off pertains to the distribution of outcomes in mainly two 
dimensions, or outcomes: wellness of macroeconomics and wellness of individuals. The former 
refers to all outcomes that are considered beneficial for a population’s economy in aggregate 
(e.g., higher economic growth, more trade, stable currency); the latter refers to all outcomes 
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that are considered beneficial for a person as an atomic unit (e.g., better physical and mental 
health, less stress, access to sufficient material assets). While these two outcomes often 
reinforce each other, on several occasions—such as in the context of structural adjustments or 
austerity—they can be at odds with each other (McKee et al., 2012; Stuckler and Basu, 2013). 
For example, when the IMF balances a country’s budget, its austerity policies tend to stipulate 
less spending on health and social systems.  
Our article (a) reviews the findings of empirical studies focusing on what (causal) direction 
IMF policies push the wellness of individuals, focusing on children’s health as a case study; (b) 
evaluates which of four theories in distributive ethics is appropriate for governing IMF Articles 
of Agreement while minimizing potential harm to individuals’ outcomes; and (c) formalizes 
this distributive-ethics in causal-inference language. The four theories are maximization, 
egalitarianianism, prioritarianiasm, and sufficientarianism (section 3 defines these theories).  
We present our arguments in four steps. Section I discusses the IMF’s Articles of Agreement 
and how they determine the IMF’s focus on the wellness of macroeconomics. Section II reviews 
the findings of applied policy evaluation studies, which show that in many cases IMF policies 
cause adverse effects on children’s health and material standards. We offer a summary that 
supplies an empirical foundation for the real relevance of conducting a distributive-ethics 
analysis of IMF policies. Section III evaluates four theories in distributive ethics and identifies 
which is the most compatible with balancing the IMF’s core mission on macroeconomics with 
individual well-being. Having made our argument in favor of sufficientarianism, Section IV 
proposes a qualitative rearticulation of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement and a formalization of 
these thoughts. We conclude this article with suggestions for future research.  
6 
 
Section I: Evaluating implications for health in IMF Articles of 
Agreement 
 
The IMF operates within the framework established by its 189 member-countries. The 
parameters of this framework are defined by the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, which were 
adopted at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, on July 22, 1944. These articles have been amended seven times, the last 
amendment being adopted on December 15, 2010 (IMF, 2011). A critical part of this agreement 
is Article V, section 3(a), because it shapes IMF’s focus on the wellness of macroeconomics 
(Vreeland, 2007):  
 
The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources … that will assist 
members to solve their balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the 
temporary use of the general resources of the Fund. (IMF, 2011) 
 
This article binds the IMF to assist its member-countries, but only in solving the balance of 
payment problems. Accordingly, this and reinforcing articles bind the IMF to push for public 
policies in borrowing countries that improve the wellness of macroeconomics (Clements et al., 
2013; IMF, 2016) but that simultaneously de-prioritize other issues such as population health 
and poverty.  
 
While Article V focuses the IMF on correcting macroeconomic fundamentals, Article I includes 
that these corrections should not damage national prosperity. The IMF is allowed to supply 
resources “without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity” 
(IMF, 2011). Nonetheless, as evident by both policy and scientific debates, IMF’s measures 
have not been adequate (Babb, 2005; Bohoslavsky, 2016; Stiglitz, 2003; Summers and Pritchett, 
7 
 
1993). In response to this critique, the IMF has sought to incorporate several social policies into 
its programs (IMF, 2014). By the mid-1990s, the IMF introduced policies designed to protect 
poor populations via so-called Poverty Reduction Strategies (Gupta et al., 2000). These 
strategies ranged from setting a minimum amount that a country should spend on health, known 
as priority expenditure floors (de Rato, 2006), to implementing targeted social safety nets 
(Clegg, 2014). Low-income countries, which are the most common borrowers, are given access 
to concessionary funds (Barro and Lee, 2005).  
 
Despite IMF’s effort to reduce poverty, several empirical studies signal that these efforts might 
still be insufficient to counter the adverse effects on individual well-being via other causal 
channels—such as from other economic policies bundled into the same program. Between 1985 
and 2014, the IMF operated 1,550 programs in over 130 countries (Kentikelenis et al., 2016). 
In these different programs, the IMF launched a total of 55,465 policies, but only 822 (1.5 
percent) of these were explicitly aimed to reduce poverty. The vast majority (87 percent) were 
designed to address macroeconomics imbalances (Kentikelenis et al., 2016). An IMF program 
has, on average, 36 policies. Assuming that social policies are uniformly distributed, each 
program—on average—contained only 0.36 (that is, less than one) social policy.  
 
The IMF’s Articles of Agreement match well with what the organization does empirically: it 
prioritizes macroeconomic issues over individual well-being (Copelovitch, 2010; Dreher, 
2006). This prioritization implies that even if IMF officials have an interest in improving the 
wellness of individuals, the Articles of Agreement tie them to prioritize macroeconomic over 
individual well-being. In the next section, we evaluate the empirical evidence of how this 
prioritization has affected children.  
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Section II: Reviewing the empirical evidence on the effect of the 
International Monetary Fund’s policies on children’s well-being 
 
Now that we reviewed how the Articles of Agreement regulate IMF policies, we proceed with 
evaluating the findings of empirical studies. Our question is: In what directions do IMF policies 
push child health and poverty? Thompson et al. (2017) recently reviewed studies on the effect 
of international financial organizations on maternal and child health. These organizations 
include the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. Their search identified 
six studies of interest, focusing on the effect of IMF policies on children. We updated this 
search, focusing only on IMF programs, to cover the period 2017 to date. We found three 
additional studies. Table 1 outlines these nine studies. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Seven of the nine articles identify adverse effects. While four studies find adverse direct effects 
on different child outcomes (i.e., mortalitly, poverty, vaccination, undernutrition) (Daoud and 
Johansson, 2019; Oliver, 2006; Pongou et al., 2006; Shandra et al., 2012), three studies find 
adverse indirect effects (interactions) through a third variables (i.e., democracy, education, 
public sector policies) on children (Daoud et al., 2017; Daoud and Reinsberg, 2018; Shandra et 
al., 2004). Two studies identify a beneficial direct effect: Bird et al. (2020) and Hajro and Joyce 
(2009) each find that IMF programs reduce infant mortality.We discuss the findings of the nine 
studies by identifying the direct and indirect pathways in which IMF programs are likely to 
affect child poverty.1 These pathways provide the foundation for our substantive argument and 
formalization of our ethical approach in Section IV. 
 
                                                 
1 We include additional references above these nine studies where helpful.  
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Direct pathways. IMF programs affect government spending (Bird et al., 2020), as 
governments often subsidize the costs of immunizations, food, and health services (Daoud, 
2015, 2007; Halleröd et al., 2013). Given that the IMF aims to balance the borrowing-
government budget, these subsidies are often the first to be dismantled (Shandra et al., 2011). 
Another direct pathway through which IMF programs are likely to affect child poverty is in the 
restructuring of health sectors (Daoud and Reinsberg, 2018; Oliver, 2006; Stuckler and Basu, 
2013). The IMF operates under the assumption that private actors are more efficient in 
providing healthcare and other public services (Benson, 2001). While the overall quality of 
health care might improve, privatization tends to favor rich households (Daoud and Johansson, 
2019; Ismi, 2004; Pongou et al., 2006). Those that gain from privatization thus tend to be the 
economically privileged segments of urban populations, while those that lose tend to 
concentrate in remote rural areas, far removed from modern corporations’ logic of private profit 
(Shandra et al., 2012). 
 
IMF programs also have a catalyzing effect on foreign investments and aid (Clements et al., 
2013). Recent research finds that this effect is stronger in sectors linked to the IMF’s core policy 
areas than to its noncore areas. This could, in turn, for example, give leverage to countries to 
combat health deprivations (Stubbs et al., 2016, p. 511). This means that IMF programs may 
reduce child poverty via the influx of such resources (Bird et al., 2020; Hajro and Joyce, 2009). 
 
Indirect pathways. The IMF can also affect child poverty via indirect channels, such as 
unintended (i.e., second-order) consequences of policy reforms. The first indirect pathway 
operates through state employees (Daoud and Reinsberg, 2018). The IMF programs within the 
current framework cap public sector wages (Rickard and Caraway, 2014), in a context in which 
a significant portion of health spending in low-income countries is allocated to the wages of 
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doctors and other medical staff (Kentikelenis et al., 2015). These consequences may have 
deleterious impacts on the provision and quality of health services. How this may happen is 
explained next. 
 
The second indirect pathway runs through international trade. The IMF currently seeks to 
liberalize countries’ trade and investment regimes, for example by recalibrating tariffs, quotas, 
duties, and taxes (Dreher, 2009). While these policies may eventually be beneficial for 
countries, they often first bring short-term lower revenues. This reduces budgets for targeted 
social spending, which reinforces the first direct channel outlined above (Daoud and Johansson, 
2019; Pongou et al., 2006). Moreover, IMF policies involve currency devaluations that foster 
import increases, inflate medicine and medical equipment prices, drive up the cost of clean 
water and sanitation equipment,2 and reduce children’s access to vaccines and other crucial 
health-related resources (Shandra et al., 2011).  
 
The third indirect pathway is global politics. The IMF takes different negotiation positions 
based on which country it is entering an agreement with (Vreeland, 2007), which in turn can 
affect how many resources a country gets. For example, a final agreement tends to be more 
favorable if the country has any substantial influence on the global economy or if it is compliant 
with IMF demands (Oliver, 2006; Pongou et al., 2006). Emerging powers, such as Brazil and 
Turkey, tend to have more of a say. Sub-Saharan African countries have weaker negotiation 
positions—as do other low-income countries—but they tend to get different treatment because 
of their high poverty rates, such as favorable conditionality under IMF’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy or some debt forgiveness (Dreher, 2009). Consequently, these contextual or geo-
                                                 
2 This refers to a setting in which the availability of clean and safe water is a core determinant of infant mortality 
(Shandra et al., 2011). 
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historical channels can moderate the strength of the relationship between an IMF program and 
children’s well-being, independently of the factors outlined above.  
 
All of these direct and indirect impacts of IMF programs on child poverty depend on household 
resilience (Daoud et al., 2017; Daoud and Puaca, 2011; Puaca and Daoud, 2011), which refers 
to the family members’ ability to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from economic, natural, or 
political shocks and stresses (Conklin et al., 2018; Coutts et al., 2019; Daoud et al., 2016, 2016; 
Daoud and Nandy, 2019; Kraamwinkel et al., 2019; Nandy et al., 2016; Ponce et al., 2017). 
Households with more resources tend to be more resilient than those with fewer resources. 
Nevertheless, household resilience itself can be affected by adjustment policies, negatively or 
positively. For example, changes in labor market policies (e.g., adjustments to minimum wage 
levels) will affect parents’ income and ability to care for their children. 
 
In sum, despite the IMF’s several efforts to reduce the adverse effects of its programs on 
population health, the majority of the empirical research finds a net adverse effect on children. 
These findings, therefore, reinforce the argument that transforming the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement requires injecting them with elements of distributive ethics. With such an injection, 
the IMF has a better ethical ground to balance the wellness of macroeconomics and individuals.  
Section III: Identifying distributive ethics for amending the Articles of 
Agreement 
We next evaluate four distributive-ethics theories: maximization, egalitarianianism, 
prioritarianiasm, and sufficientarianism. Foreshadowing our conclusion, we will argue that 
sufficientarianism is most compatible with the IMF’s core mission—to reinvigorate the 
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wellness of macroeconomics—and simultaneously eradicate harm to the wellness of 
individuals.  
 
Distributive ethics is an area of ethics and political philosophy that addresses the wellness of 
different distributions (i.e., allocations) of goods across individuals (Anderson, 1999; Crisp, 
2003; Tännsjö, 1998; Temkin, 1993). Distributive theories comprise at least two elements: the 
conception of goods and the pattern of distribution. Goods are often thought of in terms of 
material resources (Dworkin, 1981; Rawls, 1971), welfare (Dorsey, 2012), opportunities 
(Roemer, 1998), or capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 1992). For the purpose of our argument, 
all these capture aspects of the well-being of individuals and all say the same about the 
importance of reducing poverty and improving health as essential dimensions of wellness of 
individuals.  
 
The pattern of distribution is critical for our argument. The theory of maximization (such as 
utilitarianism) is that whatever the relevant good, what matters is that as many goods as possible 
are generated (Ord, 2013; Tännsjö, 1998). If the relevant good is welfare, for example, then 
distributions ought to be evaluated in terms of how much welfare is produced. The theory of 
egalitarianism is that whatever the relevant good, what matters is that it is distributed equally 
(Cohen, 1989; Temkin, 2003, 1993). Again, if the relevant good is welfare, distributions ought 
to be evaluated in terms of how equally the welfare is distributed. The theory of  prioritarianiasm 
is that whatever the relevant good, what matters is that the amount of priority-weighted goods 
be maximized, so that benefits are valued higher for beneficiaries who are worse off (Adler, 
2012; Fleurbaey, 2015; Parfit, 1997). If the relevant good is welfare, then distribution ought to 
be evaluated both in terms of how much welfare is produced and how the benefits are 
prioritized. The theory of sufficientarianism is that whatever the relevant good, what matters is 
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that it is distributed so that beneficiaries have a sufficient amount of that good (Casal, 2007; 
Crisp, 2003; Shields, 2012).  
 
In all these theories, individuals are the main unit of analysis. These four theories often yield 
significantly different evaluations of alternative distributions, but common to all of them is the 
distribution of goods across individuals, not groups, regions, or countries. This implies that, for 
all these theories, the wellness of macroeconomics is relevant only if it enhances the wellness 
of individuals.  
 
Focusing on distributions across individuals does not imply that the four theories are insensitive 
to the distribution of goods among groups of individuals. Distributive ethicists often recognize 
the importance of groups, but mainly as an explanatory or justifying factor for why specific 
patterns of distribution exist (Anderson 1999). For example, the unequal distribution of 
opportunity (i.e., a good) among individuals in a society such as the United States can be 
explained by groups (e.g., race and ethnicity). In this example, the distribution of opportunities 
(explanandum) is explained by race and ethnicity (explanans). All four distributive-ethical 
theories argue that it is misguided to evaluate only group-level distributions. Table 2 highlights 
this type of distribution.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In relation to countries, egalitarians and prioritarians favor equal distribution (Outcome 2) while 
maximizers favor the most goods being generated (Outcome 1), since the sum of goods in 
Outcome 1 is larger than in Outcome 2. Sufficientarians’ opinion would depend on how 
sufficiency is defined. Outcome 2 seems to have an equal distribution (less variance), and the 
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priority-weights (the added weight of benefits going to the neediest) seem to make up for the 
slightly fewer goods in this outcome. However, none of these theories can be used to make 
decisions based on outcomes without knowing how these goods are distributed within the 
countries, and we know nothing about that in this example.  
 
In Table 3 we introduce information about how goods are distributed within countries. To 
simplify our example, Country A has three inhabitants and Country B has two inhabits, but the 
general point is valid regardless of actual country size. The numbers in the brackets—denoting 
sets—signify the amount of goods each individual possesses, and the total designates the sum 
of a within-country distribution.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In Table 3, Outcome 2 distribution appears nearly equal across the two countries, but Outcome 
1 is clearly a more equitable distribution across individuals. When more is understood about 
Outcome 1, prioritarians, egalitarians, and maximizers would consider it a better option than 
Outcome 2 because it contains more goods that are more equally distributed across countries. 
As noted above, sufficientarians would first need to determine sufficiency before making a 
decision (Daoud, 2018, 2017, 2011, 2010, 2007). If this sufficiency threshold is set to 30 in this 
example, then sufficientarians would favor Outcome 1 because more individuals would reach 
over the threshold in this Outcome. 
 
This thought experiment reveals two things. The first is that country size matters—which the 
IMF acknowledges. The second is that a narrow focus on aggregate-units (i.e., countries) fails 
to account for the distribution of goods within aggregate-units—yet the IMF’s focus is on 
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aggregated economic outcomes. On the one hand, the outcome for two countries of equal size 
and with an equal amount of goods might still have significant inequality because of skewed 
distributions. On the other hand, for two countries of equal size with an unequal amount of 
goods—so that one is richer than the other (and there is country-level inequality)—the outcome 
appears relatively equal because there are no significant inequalities across the countries.  
 
This thought experiment also reveals the risk of analyzing only country-level statistics when 
evaluating individual-level outcomes—a form of the ecological fallacy in which scholars use 
group-level information to infer conclusions on individual-level outcomes. As discussed in 
Section I, the IMF’s focus is on the wellness of macroeconomics, which is captured in various 
aggregate measures (e.g., economic growth, the balance of payment). It is, of course, true that 
such aggregate measures often correlate with how the wellness of individuals are measured 
either indirectly (that is, economic growth as correlated with individual happiness) (Inglehart 
et al., 2008) or directly (that is, measured by the Gini coefficient or other measures of inequality) 
(Sen, 1992). However, as we will argue in Section IV, our distributive-ethics perspective relies 
on causal rather than correlational thinking. From this perspective, what is relevant is what 
causal effects IMF policies induce on the distribution of health, and not the general association 
between macroeconomics performance and individuals’ health. Yet, there is only one ethical 
theory that can balance such causal thinking without diverting the IMF from its core mission: 
sufficientarianism. 
Sufficientarianism  
Sufficientarianism can provide an appropriate, ethical, and minimal framework for IMF’s 
mission that balances the wellness of individuals while keeping the IMF’s focus on 
macroeconomics. As noted earlier, sufficientarianism is the theory that distribution is fair if all 
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individuals in a population have a sufficient amount of goods, and distribution is unfair if one 
or more individuals fall short of the given threshold.  
 
There are several reasons to favor this approach. First, regardless of which of the four 
distributive-ethical theories one subscribes to, there is at least one instrumental reason to also 
favor sufficientarian, and that is the idea of thresholds. From a maximizers perspective, it is 
expected that increasing the total amount of goods in a population ensures that each individual 
has at least a sufficient amount to continue contributing to the economy and community. 
Egalitarians who believe that more equal outcomes are desirable will also agree with thresholds 
because the more people reach the baseline threshold, the less inequality there will be at 
baseline. Prioritarians would agree with the threshold principle for both these reasons. We point 
out here that a minimal ethical principle for IMF’s mission is the principle of thresholds (Reddy 
and Daoud, 2020).  
 
Second, we argue that sufficientarianism fulfills a principle of human dignity, embraced by 
many international organizations. Reducing inequality is important, yet this mostly follows 
individuals securing a minimum amount of goods to lead a decent life (Sen, 1992). Having 
sufficient resources is a fundamental prerequisite to participate in economic, social, and 
political life (Anderson, 1999). In improving the wellness of macroeconomics, IMF policies 
can be expected to increase prospects of individuals surpassing a given threshold, or at least not 
affect them.  
 
Third, adopting sufficientarianism means the focus is primarily on those who fall below a given 
threshold; that is, the poorest groups in society. It is natural to use this theory when combating 
poverty and protecting the most vulnerable groups in a population. This sufficientarian focus 
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resonates with the poverty goals that the IMF has already committed to (Clements et al., 2013; 
IMF, 2016). Simultaneously, sufficientarianism should appeal to those who have criticized the 
IMF concerning the “do no harm” principle found in medical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2012; Feldstein and Feldstein, 1998). First and foremost, doctors must avoid actions that cause 
suffering; by analogy, the IMF, as a doctor of macroeconomics, should thus make sure its 
treatments do not cause suffering for individuals. 
 
Sufficientarians can have different goals. For example, some focus on a fixed level of welfare 
(Dorsey, 2012); others focus on a fixed set of capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000). Furthermore, there 
is significant disagreement among sufficientarians about how to empirically measure optimal 
outcomes, although there are several recent approaches in how to use global analyses. For 
instance, multidimensional poverty indicators might be used to more accurately track the 
success of an outcome (Alkire, 2015; Gordon et al., 2003). While these competing 
sufficientarians goals provide important insights on alternative outcomes, which one may work 
better varies by context. Nonetheless, what matters ultimately is that as many individuals as 
possible reach sufficiency thresholds (Daoud, 2018; Shields, 2012).  
Section IV: Amending the Articles of Agreement  
Now that we have identified sufficientarianism as the most suitable distributive-ethical theory 
for amending the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in this section we specify what this implies 
empirically. We formalize our approach by combining elements from causal inference (Imbens 
and Rubin, 2015; Pearl, 2009) and algorithmic fairness (Loftus et al., 2018).  
 
Our argument is divided into two parts. The first part pertains to the causes (i.e., reasons) for 
self-selecting into IMF programs, and the second accounts for the effects of IMF programs on 
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the wellness of macroeconomics and individuals. This two-part argument is depicted in our 
directed acyclic graph (DAG), shown in Figure 1. A DAG captures a causal system; a node 
indicates a causal factor; and an arrow from A to B indicates that A causes B. Mathematically, 
this arrow implies that conditional distribution of B depends on A in some (parametric or 
nonparametric) functional form, 𝑓𝑓(⋅); hence, 𝑓𝑓(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴). For simplicity, we mainly focus on 
probabilities denoted 𝑃𝑃(⋅); that is, 𝑓𝑓(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴). The graph is acyclic, meaning that a 
factor cannot cause itself. For example, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 cannot affect itself at a time point 𝑡𝑡 but it can affect 
future states of itself 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1. In the DAGs in Figure 1, we assume no common causes 
(confounding). In the next subsection, we account for the case where common causes exists, 
and discuss how we capture causality from observational data using do-calculus.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
We argue that the only causal reasons the IMF accepting countries for its programs, should be 
based on the wellness of macroeconomics, and this largely resonates with how the IMF 
currently operates. The IMF’s primary mission—unlike other UN organizations such as the 
World Bank, the World Health Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization, or 
UNICEF—is to oversee global financial stability, not to engage in population health or poverty 
reduction. While the de jure division of labor between these UN organizations exist for 
historical reasons (Ziring et al., 2005), blurring this division of labor would inflict 
incompatibilities with the organizations’ mission statements—but we will argue below that 
organizational cooperation is necessary when evaluating the causal effects of IMF programs. 
Formally, this macro focus is what our DAG in Figure 1 implies, and this selection in the 
language probability is expressed as: 
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𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 0) ≥ 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 1) 
 
Consequently, to determine whether self-selection into IMF programs is fair in a sufficientarian 
sense, we have to evaluate this probabilistic inequality. The probability of a country selecting 
in an IMF program, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1, will be greater conditional on when the wellness of 
macroeconomics indicates “poor performance” (i.e., 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 0) compared with “acceptable 
performance (i.e., 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 1). To concretize and simplify our thesis, we use a binary-valued 
indicator of 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1; but in reality, it can be multidimensional and continuously valued. We 
consider any macroeconomics indicator of interest separately and jointly (e.g., economic 
growth, inflation, balance of payments). Defining the specific indicators and the 
operationalization of “not acceptable performance” varies depending on the context, which the 
IMF is well equipped to determine. Following the natural temporality of cause and effect, 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 captures all the relevant macroeconomic parameters before (i.e., 𝑡𝑡 − 1) countries  
enter into IMF programs (at time point 𝑡𝑡).  
 
Our sufficientarian-causal framework for selection implies that the propensity to select should 
be independent of the wellness of individuals. This is indicated in panel a, Figure 1, by the 
absence of a directed arrow from 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 to IMF. The probability statement is written as: 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 0,𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 0) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 0) 
 
This probability statement implies that the wellness of individuals, 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 0, does not 
provide any causal information for self-selecting into programs. In other words, the IMF’s 
decision making on which countries enter into programs should be independent of population 
health and poverty. However, in many cases, the wellness of individuals (e.g., poor health) 
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causes the wellness of macroeconomics (Banerjee and Duflo, 2012; Deaton, 2015). This 
situation is depicted in panel b in Figure 1. This is a common situation for many low-income 
countries, so it is valid to ask whether the IMF should also consider the wellness of individuals 
(e.g., poverty and health inequality) when determining which countries should enter a program. 
Based on the spirit of the Articles of Agreement, our suggestion is that the IMF should abstain 
from these cases; these are situations that fall within the mission of the World Bank and other 
global organizations.  
 
Once a country has been entered into an IMF program, a sufficientarian approach stipulates that 
the IMF is expected to design its programs with the causal effects on both the wellness of 
macroeconomics and individuals taken under consideration. This is depicted in panel c, Figure 
1, with causal arrows pointing to 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 and 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1. For the wellness of macroeconomics, 
the equation is formulated as: 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 = 1|𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1) > 𝑃𝑃(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 = 1|𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 0) 
 
The probability of an acceptable level of wellness of macroeconomics, 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 = 1, should 
be higher after a program (i.e., 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1) compared with no program (i.e., 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 0). This 
implies that the IMF is expected to have the intended effect on macroeconomic parameters—
the raison d’etre of IMF policies (IMF, 2011). As our review reveals, however, what is not 
adequately calibrated is how these macroeconomic efforts dovetail with the wellness of 
individuals.  
 
While our causal system in panel c highlights the causal effect of IMF on macroeconomics and 
individuals, panel d shows that past wellness levels will, naturally, also have a causal effect on 
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future levels. An empirical analysis determining the extent to which IMF policies are fair would 
disentangle these causal arrows. We address this issue in the next subsection.  
 
We propose two approaches of formalizing sufficientarian for IMF effects on individuals: lax 
and stringent. A lax sufficientarian approach would include the IMF’s effect on a population as 
being beneficial or having no effect, on average. This approach implies that although IMF 
programs are nonadversarial to population health, on average, IMF policies might still emit 
adverse effects on specific individuals or subgroups. It would not evaluate the potentially 
considerable variation (e.g., heterogeneity) that IMF policies might produce (Daoud and 
Johansson, 2019). In the lax approach, 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 = 1 is an indicator for sufficient population 
health in the aggregate—for example using the Human Development Index). We define an 
ethically fair sufficientarian IMF effect as fulfilling the following probability condition: 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 = 1|𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1) ≥ 𝑃𝑃(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 = 1|𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 0) 
 
This equation states that populations in IMF programs are either better off after the program or 
unaffected compared with populations without these programs.  
 
A stringent sufficientarian approach accepts no adverse heterogeneity in an IMF impact: all 
impact heterogeneity has to be either invariant to the IMF or beneficial for all individuals i. 
This stringent approach follows logically from sufficientarianism as disaggregated. In this case, 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 1 represents individual-level health and poverty outcomes: 
 
𝑃𝑃�𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 1�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1� ≥ 𝑃𝑃�𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 1�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 0� 
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This probability implies that each individual is either better off being in an IMF program or 
unaffected as compared to an individual not in the IMF program.  
 
We refine our definition of 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼 based on sufficientarianism—it is any measure of wellness 
(e.g., malnutrition, education, sanitation) indicating if a person or a group have sufficient 
resources to satisfy this wellness at a minimum level to avoid deprivation and poverty. For 
maximizers, more is always better; for sufficientarians, any level beyond this minimum 
threshold matters little. This distinction is essential. Our stringent sufficientarian framework 
holds that IMF policies should not be held accountable for lack of improvement at the individual 
level. The IMF should be held accountable for its policies only when they deteriorate the 
situation of people, and especially when they push individuals or populations below a minimum 
threshold. This implies that stringent sufficientarian would claim that IMF policies have unfair 
effect if, and only if, a program pushes at least one individual, i, below the threshold. This logic 
also implies that if members of a population were above this well-being threshold before an 
IMF program, but because of the program some or all individuals lost a substantial portion of 
this well-being but stayed just above the threshold, then stringent sufficientarians would agree 
that this is not an unfair outcome. It is not unfair because all individuals still have sufficient 
well-being. However, the level and quality of this “sufficient threshold” varies by context. 
Following Amartya Sen’s agnostic definitions of capabilities (Sen, 1992), we emphasize that 
these thresholds have to be defined for each specific context and done so in public discourse. 
 
Before considering how to empirically measure whether IMF policies fulfill lax or stringent 
sufficientarianism, we end this section by proposing an amendment to Article V that includes 
sufficientarian principles. Revising the IMF governing articles in this way would empower the 
IMF to promote its macroeconomic focus without causing deleterious effects on health and 
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poverty. A reformulation of Article V would reinforce the wording in Article I to “do no harm 
to national prosperity.” A revised Article V, section 3(a) could be: 
 
The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources … that will 
assist members to (i) solve their balance of payments problems, and (ii) 
ensure that any adverse causes of these policies do not push individuals or 
populations below the threshold for well-being in a manner consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards 
for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund. 
 
This reformulation accommodates both stringent and lax sufficientarianism. We remain 
agnostic to which of these are optimal. At the level of ethical principles, stringent 
sufficientarianism is more authentic in spirit with an ideal sufficientarianism compared with the 
lax version. At the empirical level, however, the stringent version requires much more data. In 
situations with scarce data, it would not be possible to evaluate if IMF policies are fair without 
strong assumptions about the data-generating process. A stringent approach requires a causal 
estimate for each individual (e.g., child), while lax sufficientarianism can be routinely captured 
under the milder assumptions of commonly used causal-inference methods with observational 
data.  
Empirical identification of lax and stringent sufficientarianism 
To evaluate whether IMF policies comply with sufficientarianism, we have  to identify the 
causal effects of these policies. Because randomized controlled experiments are not possible in 
researching the IMF, scholars use observational data, but estimating causal effects—empirical 
identification—from observational data is challenging. The challenges in the literature on IMF 
policy evaluations pertain to accounting for a country wanting to enter—self-selection—an IMF 
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program for reasons other than wellness of macroeconomics (Vreeland, 2007). Empirical 
identification can be queried by the question: Under what conditions can causal effects of IMF 
policies on the wellness of individuals and macroeconomics be measured from observational 
data? There are several methods (i.e., estimators) for doing this (Stubbs et al., 2018), including 
matching, Heckman selection, instrumental variables (IV), and generalized method of moments 
(GMM). Each of these are important techniques with different strengths and weaknesses. Our 
discussion in this section relies on separating what statisticians call estimands and estimators. 
Estimands refer to the quantity of interest—in our case, these quantities refer to the causes 
leading a country to partake in  an IMF program and the effects of the policies of those programs 
on population health. These quantities can be formulated independently of data or models. 
Conversely, estimators use some data and methods (e.g., IV, matching, GMM) to produce an 
estimate of this estimand. Our ethical framework pertains first and foremost to sharpening the 
quantities of interest: the estimand. 
 
Estimating the causal effect relies on blocking or reducing the influence of confounding. 
Researchers identify vital confounders through causal reasoning that aims to depict the causal 
mechanisms influencing IMF selection (Imbens and Rubin, 2015; Pearl, 2009). In this section, 
we discuss typical causal systems—assumptions encoded in DAGs—affecting the causes and 
consequences of IMF policies. With the help of these DAGs, scholars can use existing methods 
(estimators) to estimate the causes and consequences of IMF policies.  
 
The DAGs in Figure 1 facilitate our discussion by assuming that there are no confounders. In 
these basic causal systems, in which no confounders exist, causal effects can be directly 
identified from observational data. To evaluate if countries are self-selecting into IMF programs 
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based only on macroeconomic parameters, we estimate the difference as—that is a propensity 
score model: 
 
𝛿𝛿 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 1)) − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 0)). 
 
We rely on Pearl’s (2009) do-calculus, and use the 𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(⋅) operator to signify fixing the causal 
factor of interest. For example, calculating 𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 1) implies that we intervene on the 
data by changing all 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 to 1. In general, 𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥) implies that the causal factor of 
interest can be fixed and set to 𝑥𝑥. We fix the causal variable of interest to mimic an intervention 
in the causal system—this fixing is analogous to an intervention in a randomized controlled 
trial (Pearl, 2009). For causal estimation with a binary variable, our estimand is: 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑋𝑋 = 1))- 𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑋𝑋 = 0)) 
 
For our IMF selection, if 𝛿𝛿 is positive and there are no other causal paths affecting selection (by 
assumption imprinted in our DAG), then we conclude that IMF selection is fair. To evaluate 
the impact of IMF policies on the wellness of individuals, we use the equation: 
 
𝜏𝜏 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 = 1|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1)) − 𝑃𝑃(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 = 1|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 0)) 
 
If 𝜏𝜏 is positive (i.e., there is a beneficial effect) or zero (i.e., there is no effect), then we conclude 
that the IMF impact on individuals is fair; otherwise, it is unfair in terms of lax 
sufficientarianism (we account for the stringent version below). We calculate the effect on the 
wellness of macroeconomics analogously with the equation: 
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𝛾𝛾 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 = 1|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1)) − 𝑃𝑃(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 = 1|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 0)) 
 
and expect a positive 𝛾𝛾. All these situations qualify as an “as-if random” situation.  
 
However, countries self-select into IMF programs for a number of reasons besides 
macroeconomics, such as political motivation. These other reasons are key confounders and 
must be accounted for in an empirical identification of causal effects. Figure 2 adds 
confounding, where the variables C represents one or potentially several confounders. In panel 
a, 𝐶𝐶1 represents the relevant confounders affecting self-selection. A country’s political 
motivation to implement difficult and unpopular policies is often cited as one of the most 
important confounders (Åkerström et al., 2019; Daoud et al., 2019b; Daoud and Johansson, 
2019; Dreher, 2009; Stubbs et al., 2018; Vreeland, 2007), as are the number of times a country 
partakes in IMF programs (recidivism). Conditioning or controlling for these measures uses the 
equation: 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1),𝐶𝐶1) 
 
This enables a calculation of IMF selection fairness, 𝛿𝛿. As Figure 2 shows, by conditioning on 
𝐶𝐶1,  the influence of this common cause is blocked. We can check if the wellness of individuals 
is independent of IMF selection conditional on 𝐶𝐶2 by using the equation 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1) = 0,𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 0,𝐶𝐶2) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 = 0),𝐶𝐶2) 
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Similarly, as seen in panel b, Figure 2, we calculate 𝛾𝛾 and 𝜏𝜏 by conditioning on 𝐶𝐶3 and 𝐶𝐶4, in 
their respective formulas. Accordingly, identifying a lax sufficientarian approach is empirically 
measurable when controlling for confounding.  
 
Estimating causal effects by conditioning on confounders depends on available data, and all 
necessary variables have to be observed. Often, however, important confounders can be 
unobservable, such as political motivation. In these cases, scholars frequently use an 
instrumental variable approach. This type of causal situation is depicted in panel c in Figure 2, 
where Z is the instrument. A key assumption of this method is being able to identify an 
instrument that is uncorrelated with the confounder (i.e., the absence of a causal arrow pointing 
to the confounder). Countries’ “voting patterns in the UN” and “the number of countries already 
enrolled in IMF programs“ have proven to be useful instruments (Lang, 2016; Stubbs et al., 
2018). Evaluating the degree of sufficientarianism of IMF policies in the presence of 
unobserved confounding, scholars have to rely on instruments of this sort.  
 
Identifying the causal effect depends on the postulated causal system (DAG). The DAGs in 
Figures 1 and 2 are options in a number of possible causal systems. As we discussed in the 
review of empirical studies, the causal pathways connecting IMF to the wellness of individuals 
(or the wellness of macroeconomics) depends on substantive theory, which vary depending on 
domain (e.g., economics, sociology, epidemiology). This implies that the probability of 
wellness outcome, Y, conditional on an IMF policy intervention, 𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥), depends on a 
specific domain (i.e., causal system) translated into a causa graph, 𝐺𝐺1. This can be expressed 
statistically as the probability 
𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺1(𝑌𝑌|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥),𝐶𝐶1) 
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with subscript 𝐺𝐺1 to clarify the dependence on the causal system.  
 
Along with the assumptions on the causes and effects of a country self-selecting into an IMF 
program, a sufficientarian fairness approach is agnostic to the causal system. If there are several 
competing causal systems, 𝐺𝐺1,𝐺𝐺2, …𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛, then a reasonable procedure is to sum the estimated 
effects across the proposed causal systems. This is accomplished via ensembles used in causal 
approaches in both the computer science (van der Laan et al., 2007) and algorithmic fairness 
literature (Kusner et al., 2017; Loftus et al., 2018). 
 
The estimand of stringent sufficientarianism is defined at the individual level. In do-calculus, 
the random variable is indexed to denote that each individual is drawn from ones own 
distribution. 
𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺1(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖),𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1) 
 
In the language of potential outcomes, the difference is denoted in treatment effect and indexed 
for each individual  
𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(1) − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0) 
 
Thus, estimating (that is, identifying) a stringent sufficientarian approach builds on all the same 
assumptions of a lax sufficientarian approach, but with two additional assumptions. The first is 
observing each individual i as a specific distribution of outcomes and covariates—{𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖}𝑛𝑛—
for all n individuals. The second assumption is that either each individual’s different causal 
pathway DAGi is depicted or that they operate under the same DAG. These two assumptions 
allow for an estimation of the causal effect for each individual, and an evaluation if stringent 
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sufficientarianism is fulfilled (Kusner et al., 2017; Lillie et al., 2011; Loftus et al., 2018; van 
and Petersen, 2007).  
 
The synthetic control method is one of the few existing estimators that can be used to estimate 
the estimand 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, but this requires high-quality panel data for each individual. Another technique 
is to impute the Conditional Average Treatment Effect (CATE) using machine-learning 
techniques (Künzel et al., 2018), as in the equation: 
 
 𝜏𝜏(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 1), 𝑿𝑿 = 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1|𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 0), 𝑿𝑿 = 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖] 
 
Here, 𝑿𝑿 is a set of covariates, including confounders. For each individual, this set is drawn from 
the distribution of the same random variables (i.e., not drawn from different random variables 
𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 indexed by i). This quantity 𝜏𝜏(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) allows for an approximation of 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 ≈ 𝜏𝜏(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖). This equation 
implies that each individual’s causal effect is estimated on group similarity defined by the 
covariates 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖. Daoud and Johansson (2018) use this method to estimate the impact of IMF 
programs on child poverty from cross-sectional data, and CATE is the best estimate of  
individual level treatment effects (Künzel et al., 2018). In reality, this means that the effects on 
various groups of individuals can be measured, but not for each individual. Even if a stringent 
sufficientarian approach is measurable only under strong causal assumptions, it remains an 
important perspective (i.e., estimand) to theorize about the fairness, IMF programs, and 
individual well-being.  
Conclusions 
We have argued that the IMF’s Articles of Agreement that govern the organization’s mission 
should be calibrated using the sufficientarian theory. This would allow the IMF to keep its focus 
on the wellness of macroeconomics but integrate it with the wellness of individuals. The IMF 
30 
 
has to account for what causal effects its policies have on populations, both at the aggregate 
and individual levels. This calibration, however, should not include changes in how the IMF 
selects countries for its programs, because the wellness of macroeconomics should continue to 
take precedence.  
 
We based our argument both on distributive ethics and a literature review of the social sciences 
that empirically evaluates the impact of IMF policies on children’s well-being. We used child 
health and poverty as our case study, and the literature review shows an adverse effect of IMF 
policies in the majority of these types of cases. The nine studies we reviewed supply evidence 
that the wellness of macroeconomics and wellness of individuals are, in many cases, at odds. 
Attempts by the IMF to redesign its policy to not aggravate poverty has proven insufficient. An 
alternative path, we argued, is to provide an augmented mandate to the IMF that explicitly 
considers the wellness of individuals. We proposed a revised Article V of the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement and guiding ethical principles. We showed how, of the four theories discussed 
above, the IMF’s Articles of Agreement could be rearticulated to accommodate a sufficientarian 
theory, because it is the one most compatible with the IMF mission while simultaneously 
supporting desired health outcomes. In the context of IMF policies, sufficientarianism holds 
that a fair allocation of goods allows the IMF and countries in need to formulate economic 
policies that provide at least the minimum resources required to counter the ill-health and 
poverty caused specifically by some IMF policies. We showed how the Articles of Agreement 
could be reformulated qualitatively, and formalized our framework using the language of causal 
inference and algorithmic fairness.  
 
Our conclusion has several implications. First, to implement our approach, the IMF has to 
reinforce its staff with experienced social epidemiologists, demographers, and sociologists who 
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can evaluate the causes of population health, social inequality, and individual deprivation 
beyond income poverty. These experts also possess distinct expertise to evaluate the effects of 
IMF programs on social, cultural, and individual processes (Woolcock, 2009). This new staff 
would complement IMF economists, who evaluate countries self-selecting into IMF programs 
and the effects of these programs on the wellness of macroeconomics. 
 
Second, although one practical difficulty in implementing our ethics framework is estimating 
causal effects from observational data, evaluating lax sufficientarianism is achievable with 
existing causal-inference methods. It requires estimating the cause (that is, reason) of a specific 
IMF policy at the population level. While lax sufficientarianism would be easier to implement 
in practice, stringent sufficientarianism would more aligned to the principles of 
sufficientarianism. An important connection for stringent sufficientarianism is the recent 
algorithm for fairness, including in the personalized medicine, literature (Kusner et al., 2017; 
Lillie et al., 2011). This type of sufficientarianism requires estimating the causal effect of IMF 
policies at the individual level. Future research can deepen this connection.  
 
Another important area of future research will be developing models that consistently estimate 
both forward- and backward-looking causality. In policy settings, estimation has to not only 
work backward in time (ex-post) but also forward in time (ex-ante). The IMF and other similar 
organizations have to evaluate whether its own policies are fair before they implement them. If 
they are not fair, then they need further calibration before implementation. However, while 
many traditional causal models can conduct ex-post evaluations, a new method would have to 
incorporate a portion of causal estimation and causal prediction—beyond pure prediction 
(Daoud et al., 2019a). This is an active area of research in machine-learning and causality 
(Gechter et al., 2019).  
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Third, our argument supports a substantive shift from economics first to health first (Daniels, 
1985). It also supports a shift in normative thinking regarding good healthcare policy in favor 
of putting health (and poverty) first, not justice. Our dual framework keeps the IMF mandate to 
protect macroeconomic wellness, but not at the cost of the wellness of individuals. When these 
concerns conflict with one another, tradeoffs have to be empirically grounded to account for 
the complex interactions between health outcomes and their social determinants (Deaton, 2015; 
Marmot and Wilkinson, 2005; McKee et al., 2012). 
 
An objection to our argument is that the IMF’s current focus on the wellness of 
macroeconomics already reflects the importance of how well off individuals are. However, as 
we argued in Section III, and as many before us have noted, wellness of macroeconomics is not  
valuable in and of itself (Daoud, 2018; Nussbaum, 2000; Reddy and Daoud, 2020; Sen, 1992). 
Without a functioning economy, population health is expected to take a toll causally, because 
the economy is only a means to an end.  
 
By contrast, the wellness of individuals is valuable because it directly affects human life; it 
mitigates significant ill-health and increases health equities among individuals (Krieger, 2007). 
Nevertheless, in addition to mitigating poverty and reducing health inequalities, improving the 
wellness of individuals has positive effects on other populations in indirect ways. For example, 
the likelihood that a child has poor health is significantly smaller if the parents are in good 
health. It is known that individuals in good health contribute more to economic and social 
development, and more to innovation development that benefits the country.  
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Directed acyclic graphs depicting stylized causal systems of the relationships among IMF policies, the wellness of 
macroeconomics, and the wellness of individuals. 
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Figure 2: Directed acyclic graphs depicting stylized causal systems with confounding 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1: the effects of IMF on children’s well-being 
 Focus Sample Period IMF impact 
(Shandra et al., 
2012) 
Infant mortality 32 Sub-Saharan 
countries 
1990-2005 Adverse  
(Hajro and Joyce, 
2009) 
Infant mortality 82 low and 
middle-income 
countries 
1985-2000 Beneficial 
(Shandra et al., 
2004) 
Infant mortality 59 low and 
middle-income 
countries 
1980-1997 Adverse (in interaction 
with democracy 
(Oliver, 2006) Infant mortality 
and child mortality 
Argentina & 
Uruguay 
1980-2000 Adverse 
(Pongou et al., 
2006) 
Child 
undernutrition 
3510 children in 
Cameroon 
1991-1998 Adverse 
(Daoud et al., 
2017) 
Child health across 
five outcomes 
1,941,734 
children in 67 low 
and middle-
income countries 
2000 (±5) Adverse (in moderation 
with the head of 
household education) 
(Daoud and 
Reinsberg, 2018) 
Under-five 
mortality and child 
vaccination 
128 developing 
countries 
1980-2014 Adverse (in IMF public 
sector policies) 
(Daoud and 
Johansson, 2019) 
Child poverty 1,941,734 
children in 67 low 
and middle-
income countries 
2000 (±5) Adverse 
(Bird et al., 2020) Infant mortality 48 countries low 
and middle-
income countries 
1990-2015 Beneficial 
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Table 2: Between-population distribution of goods 
 Outcome 1 Outcome 2 
Country A 100 goods 75 goods 
Country B 50 goods 70 goods 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Within-population distribution of goods 
 Outcome 1 Outcome 2 
Country A {30, 30, 40}=100 {10, 10, 55}=75 
Country B {25, 25}=50 {20, 50}=70 
 
 
 
